



Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: 




Dahlia El - Hawary 











More than 200 Islamic financial institutions (IFI) are operating in 48 countries. Their combined assets 
exceed $200 billion with an annual growth rate between 12% and 15%.  The regulatory regime governing 
Islamic financial institutions varies significantly across countries. A number of international organizations 
have been established with the mandate to set standards that would strengthen and eventually harmonize 
prudential regulations as they apply to IFI. The paper contributes to the discussion on the nature of the 
prudential standards to be developed.  It clarifies the risks IFI are exposed to and the type of regulation that 
would be needed to systemically manage them.  It considers that the industry is still in a development 
process whose eventual outcome is the convergence of the practice of Islamic financial intermediation with 
its conceptual foundations.  Accordingly, the paper contrasts the risks and regulation that would be needed 
in the case of Islamic financial intermediation operating according to a) core principles, and b) current 
practice. Implications for approaches to capital adequacy, licensing requirements and reliance on market 
discipline are outlined. An organization of the industry that would allow it to develop in compliance with 
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Over the past few decades, the Islamic financial industry has rapidly expanded 
worldwide.  While it is difficult to identify precisely the date of the first formal Islamic 
financial institution in recent history, references are often made to the Mitghamr Egypt 
Savings Association in 1963.
2 Currently about 240 Islamic financial institutions may 
have total combined assets in excess of $200 billion in more than 48 countries.
3  Their 
rapid growth has gained considerable attention in international financial circles where 
various market participants have recognized promising potentials. According to some 
estimates, it is expected that Islamic banking will be able to attract 40% to 50% of the 
total savings of the Muslim population worldwide within the next few years.
4  T o  
capitalize on the potential of that market, a number of global financial institutions—
including but not limited to, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, BNP-Paris-Bas, and UBS—have 
established Islamic banking Shariah compatible services in several countries.
5 
 
  The growth opportunity as well as the challenges facing the development of the 
Islamic financial industry in the global market have raised public policy issues in the 
jurisdictions in which they operate and internationally. These have led international 
organizations, international standard setters, national regulatory authorities, policy 
makers and academia to examine various aspects of Islamic financial intermediation each 
from their own perspective. Focus has been directed notably on Islamic financial 
institutions’ (IFI’s) risk management practices, the broad institutional environment in 
which they operate, and the regulatory framework that governs them. A number of 
institutions have been established to become focal points on major issues, in particular 
the Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank H. van Greuning, J.Hanson and R.van der Bijl as well as participants of a 
seminar held at the World Bank on October 27
th, 2003 for their comments.  
2 Ali (2002); see also Archer & Ahmed (2003).  
3 With some estimates close to $250 billion. According to the Association of Islamic Banks, as of 1997, 
29% of Islamic banks were in South Asia, 20% in Africa, 18% in South East Asia and 15% in the Middle 
East, 12% in the GCC countries, 5% in Europe and America and 1% in Asia. See Archer & Ahmed (2003). 
4 Zaher & Hassan (2001). 
5 Sundarajan and Errico (2002).   3
International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC).
6 
 
While the rapid expansion of Islamic financing activity has created expectations, 
it has also raised apprehensions on the risks that may be associated with it. Financial 
innovation often brings with it changes in the perception of risk.  Merton (1995) makes 
the point that “less apparent understanding of the new environment can create a sense of 
greater risk even if the objective level of risk in the system is unchanged or reduced”.  
Islamic finance is not immune to such perceptions.  The emergence of Islamic finance on 
the world financial landscape presents challenges similar to that of financial innovation. 
In line with Merton’s observation, it is generating concerns on the inherent risks it 
presents and their possible spillover on the rest of the financial system as it is less well 
understood than conventional finance.  
 
This perception is compounded by a number of factors specific to Islamic finance 
that may add hurdles to its understanding and uncertainty as to the nature of Islamic 
financial intermediation. First, there is the divergence between the paradigm of Islamic 
finance, or its theoretic conception, and the way it is practiced in many instances.
7  
Second, actual Islamic financial institutions have to adapt to their environment where 
they have to compete with conventional financial intermediaries and do not have access 
to the same money market instruments for liquidity management purposes. Third, each 
institution’s  Shariah board and prevailing local legal tradition and interpretations 
combine with the market’s competitive pressure to shape the activity of each Islamic 
financial institution (IFI).  Fourth, in most of the jurisdictions, IFI are still required to 
comply with the regulations governing conventional financing and to use accounting 
standards that may not be fully adapted to the substance of their business activities. Fifth, 
there are variations within the paradigm reflecting five schools of thought, each providing 
                                                 
6 For a description of the role of each institution, see Ali (2002). 
7 See for instance Moody’s (2001), which reports that “A survey of published accounts indicates that most 
Islamic banks do not see their on-balance sheet deposits as being profit-and-loss sharing”, Special 
Comment, January.   4
its own interpretation on the nature of financial transactions and products that may or not 
be compatible with Shariah.
8   
  
This paper’s objective is a contribution to the clarification of the risks IFI are 
exposed to and the type of regulation required to systemically manage them.  In pursuing 
this objective, the paper considers that the industry is still in a development process 
whose eventual outcome is the convergence of practice with conceptual foundations. It 
consequently distinguishes, for analytical purposes, theoretical and practiced Islamic 
financial intermediation, the risks they present and the regulation they call for.  
 
In addressing the foregoing issues, the paper deals first in section I with the nature 
of Islamic financial intermediation, that is the functions it aims to fulfill.  Section II then 
identifies the risks associated with those functions. These two first sections lay the 
ground for section III, where the nature of regulation that may be needed is considered.  
In each of the foregoing areas, a distinction is made between the paradigm Islamic 
financial intermediation and a stylization of prevailing practice.  Section IV outlines a 
vision for the industry. Finally section V concludes on the challenges lying ahead in the 
development of a regulatory framework for IFI. 
 
Section I:   Functions of Financial Intermediation 
Financial systems are crucial for efficient allocation of resources in a modern 
economy. Their landscape is determined by the nature of financial intermediation, i.e. 
how the function of intermediation is performed and who intermediates between 
suppliers and users of the funds. The acquiring and processing of information about 
economic entities, the packaging and repackaging of financial claims, and the financial 
contracting are common elements in the activities that differentiate financial 
intermediation from other economic activities.
9   
 
                                                 
8 The five schools are: Hanafi, Shafei, Hanbali, Maliki and Ibadi. These differences are not further 
discussed in this paper. Please refer to Saleh (1986).  
9 Draper and Hoag (1978).   5
The main functions of a financial intermediary are asset transformation, conduct 
of orderly payments, brokerage and risk transformation.  Asset transformation takes place 
in the form of matching the demand and supply of financial assets and liabilities (e.g., 
deposits, equity, credit, loans and insurance) and entails the transformation of maturity, 
scale, and place of financial assets and liabilities of ultimate borrowers and lenders. The 
function of administration of an accounting and payments system (e.g., check transfer, 
electronic funds transfer, settlement, clearing) is considered another important 
intermediation. Typically, financial intermediaries have also offered pure brokerage or 
match-making between the borrowers and lenders, and facilitated the demand and supply 
of non-tangible and contingent assets and liabilities, such as collateral, guarantees, 
financial advice, and custodial services.
10  
 
Financial intermediaries not only channel resources from capital surplus agents 
(generally households) to capital deficit ones (corporate sector), they also allow inter-
temporal smoothing of households’ consumption and businesses’ expenditures and thus 
allow both firms and households to share risks.
11 Since the early 1980s increased 
financial market complexity and volatility have led financial intermediaries to innovate 
and offer products to mitigate, transfer and share financial risks.
12 
 
A - Islamic Financial Intermediation: Nature of Contracts   
One may view the Islamic financial system as grounded in four basic principles: 
a) risk - sharing -- the terms of financial transactions need to reflect a symmetrical risk/ 
return distribution each participant to the transaction may face; b) materiality -- a 
financial transaction needs to have a “material finality”, that is it is directly or indirectly 
linked to a real economic transaction; c) no exploitation – a financial transaction should 
not lead to the exploitation of any party to the transaction; and d) no financing of sinful 
                                                 
10 Scholtens (1993). 
11Allen & Gale (2000). 
12 Demand for risk management and hedging tools suddenly increased after the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods system in early 1970s, which resulted in increased volatility in foreign exchange and interest rates.  
Other factors stimulating financial innovations are liberalization of capital accounts, deregulations and 
breakthroughs in technology. See also Grais & Kantur (2003) for the impact of these processes on the 
MENA financial system.   6
activities such as the production of alcoholic beverages. Financial intermediation based 
on the principles of Islam has an established historical record and has made significant 
contributions to economic development over time.  Financiers in early periods of Islam 
were known as sarrafs who undertook many of the traditional and basic functions of a 
conventional financial institution, such as intermediation between borrowers and lenders, 
operation of a secure and reliable domestic as well as cross-border payment system, and 
offering services such as issuance of promissory notes and letters of credit.
13  Sarrafs 
operated through an organized network and well-functioning markets, which established 
them as a sophisticated intermediary given the tools and technology of their time.
14  
There is evidence that some of the concepts, contracts, practices and institutions 
developed in the Islamic legal sources of the late eighth century provided the foundations 
for similar instruments in Europe several centuries later.
15 
 
In Islam, the whole fabric of Divine Law is contractual in its conceptualization, 
content, and application. Islam forcefully places all economic relations on the firm 
footing of “contractus”.
16 Islamic economics is based on a set of contracts and 
instruments which form the backbone and building blocks for more complex and 
elaborate frameworks.





                                                 
13 For further details see Udovitch (1981), who equated the function of sarrafs with a bank and considered 
them as "bankers without banks".  
14 Chapra and Ahmed (2002).  It is claimed that financial intermediaries in the early Islamic period also 
helped each other overcome liquidity shortages on the basis of a mutual help arrangement.   
15  Udovitch (1981). 
16 Mirakhor (1989). Contractual foundation of the Shariah judges the virtue of justice in man not only for 
his material performance but also by the essential attribute of his forthright intention (niyya) with which he 
enters into every contract. This intention consists of sincerity, truthfulness and insistence on rigorous and 
loyal fulfillment of what he/she has consented to do (or not to do).  This faithfulness to one’s contractual 
obligations is so central to Islamic belief that when the Prophet was asked “who is the believer?”  He 
replied that “a believer is a person in whom the people can trust their person and possessions.” 
17 Several instruments find their roots in the pre-Islamic period but were further developed and widely 
practiced after confirming their compatibility with the principles of Shariah, i.e. elimination of riba and 

















Figure 1 classifies contracts governing economic activities into transactional and 
intermediation contracts. Transactional contracts govern real sector transactions that 
include exchange, trade and the financing of economic activities. The role of 
intermediation contracts is to facilitate an efficient and transparent execution of 
transactional contracts. Transactional contracts combined with intermediation contracts 
offer a set of instruments with varying purposes, maturities and degrees of risk to satisfy 
a diverse group of economic agents.
18 
                                                 
18 Please refer to Annex I for a description of Islamic financial instruments as well as a glossary of Arabic 
























Islamic Financial System (IFS)
Profile of Contracts  8
1- Transactional contracts 
The core transactional contracts are based on commodity trade based contracts 
like  murabaha  (mark-up or cost-plus), bay salam and bay mua’jal, which ultimately 
create instruments to provide financing of such economic transactions.  It would not be 
an exaggeration to claim that the resultant financing techniques are somewhat similar to 
modern day asset-backed securities. Whereas a typical asset-backed security in the 
conventional system is a claim against a pool of assets, Islamic instruments are claims 
against individual assets. A distinct feature of such financial securities is that they 
resemble conventional debt securities characterized by a pre-determined pay-off with the 
difference that Islamic instruments are collateralized against a real asset. The result is that 
a financial claim is created against a real asset with a short-term maturity and relatively 
low risk. 
 
Thus on one end of the risk continuum, the system offers asset-backed securities 
while on the other extreme the system promotes equity participation (musharaka).
19 In 
case of musharaka, the capital owner enters into a partnership by contributing equity with 
others in return for sharing profits and losses at a predetermined ratio.
20 The partners’ 
contributions need not be equal, and contributions may be in the form of physical or 
intangible capital, such as labor, management, skill and goodwill.  In between the two 
extremes, there are other collateralized securities originating from ijara (leasing) or 
istisna contracts attached to real assets, which can cater to the needs of investors looking 
for short to medium-term maturity. In addition to the foregoing transactional contracts, 
the system also offers contracts like Zakat and Qard-hassana, which are meant to 
promote social welfare.  
                                                 
19 In the case of mark-up or cost-plus modes of financing, the finance user stands obligated to pay back the 
entire financing.  The repayment by the finance user is, in fact, predetermined in advance and hence 
becomes a sort of debt from the finance user’s  point of view.  For further details, see F. Khan (1994) 
20 In the early books of Fiqh, the partnership business has been discussed mainly under the caption of 
shirka.  However, contemporary scholars have preferred to use the term musharaka to represent a broader 
concept combining features of shirka and mudaraba.  Therefore, in the case of musharaka, a musharik also 
provides capital in addition to management skills. For further details, see Ayoub (2002).    9
2 – Intermediation contracts 
A second class of contracts are the financial intermediation ones including 
mudaraba, kifala, amana, takaful,
21 wikala and ju’ala. In a mudaraba contract, an 
economic agent with capital (rabb -ul- mal) can develop a partnership with another 
economic agent (mudarib) who has expertise in deploying capital into real economic 
activities with an agreement to share the profits. Losses are borne by the capital owner 
only as the mudarib does not make any capital contribution. The latter may however be 
liable for a loss in case of misconduct or negligence on his part. However, though the 
capital owner is exposed to a loss of capital, he is not entitled to participate in the 
management of the funds, which is exclusively left to the mudarib.
22  
 
Contracts such as kifala, amana, wikala and ju'ala supplement the functions of 
financial intermediation. Through these contracts other functions of a financial system, 
such as custodial services, brokerage, consulting, guarantees and insurance, can be 
designed.  In the case of kifala, a third party becomes surety for the payment of a debt, if 
unpaid by the person originally liable. It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will 
pay the debt, fine or any other liability. In Islamic law, kifala is the creation of an 
additional liability with regard to the claim, not to the debt.
23  The contract of ju’ala deals 
with offering a service for a predetermined fee or commission.  A party pays another 
party a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specified service in 
accordance to the terms of the contract stipulated between them.  The contract of Ju’ala 
can be utilized to offer consultations, professional services, fund placements and trust 
services.  Ju'ala allows contracting on an object not certain to exist or to come under a 
party's control. It can be utilized to introduce innovative financing structures.
24 
 
                                                 
21 Takaful is in the nature of mutual insurance contract 
22 Another distinct feature of mudaraba is that the distribution of profits can only take place after the capital 
owner has retrieved his capital. Any intervening, possibly periodic distribution before the closing of the 
accounts is considered as tentative and subject to final review and revision to make good on any loss of  
capital. See Fadeel (2002). 
23 Ayoub (2002) 
24 Vogel and Hayes (1998)    10
Mudaraba (a trustee finance contract) and musharaka (equity partnership)
25 are 
the most popular contracts and are suitable for conducting financial intermediation. Both 
types of contracts were able to mobilize the entire reservoir of monetary resources of the 




B - Islamic Financial Intermediation: A Conceptual Framework 
The set of instruments discussed above can be used to establish a formal model 
for a financial intermediary operating in an Islamic Financial System. An Islamic 
financial institution (IFI) will perform the typical functions of financial intermediation 
through screening profitable projects and monitoring the performance of projects on 
behalf of the investors who deposit their funds with the IFI. The mudaraba contract 
becomes the cornerstone of financial intermediation and thus banking. Two theoretical 
models have been suggested for the structure of an IFI.  The first model is based on 
mudaraba and is commonly referred to as the "two - tier mudaraba" model. The second 
is the “two - windows” model. 
 
The basic concept of the “two - tier mudaraba” model is that both funds 
mobilization and funds utilization are on the same basis of profit sharing among the 
investor (depositor), the bank and the entrepreneur.  The first tier mudaraba contract is 
between the investor and the bank, where investors act as suppliers of funds to be 
invested by the bank on their behalf as mudarib; the investors share in the profits earned 
by the bank's business related to the investors’ investments. Funds are placed with the 
bank in an investment account.  The liabilities and equity side of the bank’s balance sheet 
thus shows the deposits accepted on a mudaraba basis. Such profit-sharing investment 
                                                 
25 In musharaka and mudaraba, the ratio of profit distribution may differ from that of capital contribution, 
but the loss must be divided exactly in accordance with the ratio of capital invested by each of the partners. 
See Ayoub (2002). 
26 It is claimed that these instruments were used not only by Muslims but also by Jews and Christians to the 
extent that interest-bearing loans and other overly usurious practices were not in common use.  See 
Udovitch (1981) and Chapra and Ahmed (2002)   11
deposits are not liabilities (the capital is not guaranteed and they incur losses if the bank 
does so), but are a form of limited-term, non-voting equity. 
 
The second tier represents the mudaraba contract between the bank as supplier of 
funds and the entrepreneurs who are seeking funds and agree to share profits with the 
bank according to a certain percentage stipulated in the contract. In this model, in 
addition to investment deposits, banks would accept demand deposits that yield no 
returns and are repayable on demand at par value and are treated as liabilities.  
 
The model does not feature any specific reserve requirements on either 
investment or demand deposits. It has been argued that in contrast to investment deposits, 
demand deposits are liabilities which are not supposed to absorb any loss and therefore 
reserve requirement should be introduced for them.
27  A distinguishing feature of the 
"two-tier" model is that, by design, the assets and liabilities sides of a bank's balance 
sheet are fully integrated and thus minimize the need for active asset/liability 
management, which provides stability against economic shocks. 
 
The second model is referred to as the "two-windows" model. It also features 
demand and investment accounts, but takes a different view from the "two-tier" model on 
reserve requirements. According to the "two-windows" model, bank “liabilities” are 
divided into two windows: one for demand deposits (liabilities in the strict sense) and the 
other for investment deposits (not strictly liabilities), the choice of the window being left 
to the depositors. Investment deposits are used to finance risk-bearing investment projects 
with the depositor's full awareness. The model requires banks to hold a 100 percent 
reserve on the demand deposits that are guaranteed by the bank and a zero percent 
reserve on the investment deposits that are used by the banks to finance risk-bearing 
investments. 
                                                 
27 Mirakhor (1989) and Khan (1986).   12
On its “liabilities” side, an IFI offers current, savings, investment and special 
investment accounts to depositors (Figure 2).  Current accounts are demand accounts and 
are kept with the bank on custodial arrangements and are repayable in full on demand. 
Current accounts are based on the principle of al-wadiah (trust or safekeeping), creating 
an agency contract for the purpose of protecting and safekeeping depositor’s assets. The 
major portion of an IFI's financial “liabilities” would consist of investment accounts that 
are strictly not liabilities but a form of equity investment, generally based on the principle 
of mudaraba.
28 They would be offered in different variations, often linked to a pre-agreed 
period of maturity, which could range from one month upward and could be withdrawn if 
advance notice is given to the bank.  The returns are distributed between depositors and 
the bank according to a predetermined ratio.  A distribution of 80 percent to investors and 
20 percent to the bank would be typical.
29   
 
                                                 
28  Particularly the case for general investment accounts. 












An IFI may offer special investment accounts customized for high net-worth 
individuals or institutional clients. These accounts also operate on the principle of 
mudaraba, but the modes of investment of the funds and the distribution of profits are 
customized to the needs of the clients.  In general, special investment accounts are linked 
to special investment opportunities identified by the IFI. These opportunities would have 
specific size and maturity and result from IFI participation in a syndication, private 
equity, joint venture or a fund.  To some extent these special investment accounts 
resemble specialized funds to finance different asset classes. The maturity and 
distribution of profits for special investment accounts are negotiated separately for each 
account, with the yield directly related to the success of the particular investment 
project.
30 Special investment accounts have considerable potential for designing and 
developing funds with specific risk-return profiles to offer high net worth and corporate 
clients opportunities to manage portfolios and to perform risk management.  In addition 
to deposits, IFI offer basic banking services, such as fund transfers, letters of credit, 
foreign exchange transactions and investment management and advice for a fee to retail 
and institutional clients. 
                                                 
30 Lewis and Algaoud (2001). 




























Figure 2. Conceptual  Balance Sheet of IFI   14
Whereas the liabilities side of an IFI offers limited modes of raising funds, the 
asset side can carry a more diversified portfolio of heterogeneous asset classes 
representing a wider spectrum of risk and maturity profile. For short-term maturity, 
limited-risk investments, there is a choice of asset-backed securities that resemble debt 
securities in terms of the payoffs. Such securities originate from trade related activities, 
and include murabaha, bay mua’jal, or bay salam that are arranged by the IFI which uses 
its skills, market knowledge as well as its customer base to finance the trading activity.  
In addition, an IFI can provide short-term funds to its clients to meet their working capital 
needs. The short-term maturity of these instruments and their backing by real assets 
minimize their level of risk.  IFI consider these securities highly attractive and give them 
preference over other investment vehicles.  
 
For the medium-term maturity investments, IFI have several choices. They can 
invest in ijara and istisna based assets.
31  A benefit of these contracts is not only that they 
are backed by an asset, but they can also have either a fixed or floating rate feature, 
which can facilitate portfolio management. Common features of Islamic (ijara) and 
conventional leasing provide additional investment opportunities for IFI since investing 
in conventional leases with appropriate modifications can be made consistent with 
Shariah principles.  In addition, IFI can set up special purpose (customized) portfolios to 
invest in a particular asset class and sector and can finance these portfolios by issuing 
special purpose mudarabas in the form of special investment accounts. In that sense, this 
segment of the asset side represents a fund of funds, each financed by matching 
mudaraba  contracts on the liabilities side through special investment accounts. For 
longer-term maturity investments, IFI can engage into venture capital or private equity 
activities in the form of musharaka.  
 
                                                 
31 F. Khan (1994) points out that leasing would require a bank to deviate from its basic character as a 
financial intermediary, as it would require it to get involved in purchasing an asset and then keep its 
ownership until the asset is disposed of responsibility in terms of maintenance and associated costs over the 
life of the contract (at least for operating lease).  Disposing  of the asset  requires not only bearing all risks 
resulting from price fluctuations, but also some marketing expertise. All this will require the bank to 
engage in activities beyond financial intermediation.     15
C - Islamic Financial Intermediation and Prevailing Practice 
 
Current practices of IFI and the composition of their balance sheets differ from 
the theoretical models mentioned above in four aspects. These affect the industry’s 
evolution and the challenges it poses to regulators. 
 
The first difference appears in the significant deviation of the structure of assets 
from what the theory would prescribe. On the assets side of the balance sheet, as 
expected a clear preference for asset-backed securities (based on trade finance) is evident.  
This preference is due to the fact that sale-related securities are considered low risk and 
resemble familiar conventional fixed-income securities in terms of the risk-return profile. 
In conjunction with issues related to mudaraba and musharaka, these factors make these 
asset backed securities the preferred choice. In addition to trade-based instruments, 
Islamic banks prefer leasing, considered to carry a lower risk and have less uncertain 
returns than musharaka or mudaraba.  In a typical Islamic bank, sale and lease-based 
transactions dominate the assets portfolio and can exceed 80 percent, with the remainder 
allocated to profit-sharing arrangements.
32 As a result, IFI have limited themselves to a 
small set of asset classes that constrain their opportunities for portfolio diversification and 
its benefits. Although this practice is conservative in nature as assets are collateralized, it 
has associated costs in terms of additional exposure to credit and operational risk. 
 
A second aspect of the divergence between the practice and the premises is in the 
choice and application of accounting policies that affect the allocation of income between 
shareholders and account holders or between different classes of account holders.  In its 
essence, Islamic finance would be consistent with clear barriers in the deployment of 
assets between those funded by demand deposits, general investment accounts, special 
investment accounts and equity.  However, current practice does not include such 
barriers, with the asset side treated as one large bucket with all stakeholders’ funds co-
mingled together.  In other words, operating IFI claim to represent a hybrid of both 
commercial and investment banks more akin to universal banks. However, unlike 
                                                 
32 Iqbal and Mirakhor (2002).   16
conventional universal banks, IFI do not erect firewalls to separate, legally, financially 
and managerially, their investment and commercial banking services.
33  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
investment accounts’ funds are not “ring-fenced” from other funds, including those of 
equity holders.  This is one of the most critical deviations in the practice of IFI and one 
that poses a tough challenge to regulators because different stakeholders of IFI need to be 
regulated under different regulating principles. Therefore, taking a one-solution-for-all 
approach becomes restrictive and may defeat the whole objective of regulation in this 
case. 
 
A third divergence between practice and principles, related somewhat to the 
preceding issues, is the status of investment accounts. Although they are supposed to be 
operating on profit and loss principles, actual practice differs. IFI have faced the criticism 
that when they do write down the value of assets, they do not in practice write down the 
value of deposits.
34  This implies that losses on the asset side are absorbed by either other 
deposit holders or the equity holders.  This practice raises a question on the degree of 
transparency and information disclosure they practice.  It also raises the issue of the need 
to separate asset types to match them closely to liabilities either through fire-walling or 
segmentation. 
 
A fourth divergence stems from the governance rights granted to investment 
account holders. Large investment accounts serve as a source of capital to finance pools 
of investments and assets of the financial institution, but their holders are not granted any 
participation in the governance or monitoring process.
35 The majority of investment 
account holders are individuals who may not organize themselves collectively to perform 
the necessary monitoring. Under such circumstances, the responsibility of regulators and 
Shariah boards increases to make sure that an adequate monitoring mechanism is in place 
to protect the rights of investment account holders.  
                                                 
33 Karim (2001). 
34 Cunningham (2001). 
35 Archer, Karim and Al-Deehani (1998).   17
SECTION II: THE RISK PROFILE IN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION   
In their intermediation function, IFI face risks that affect their ability to compete 
and to meet the interests of their stakeholders, namely, depositors, shareholders and 
regulators.  A robust risk management capability, a business friendly institutional 
environment and an efficient regulatory framework would help Islamic banks reduce 
their exposure to risks, and enhance their ability to compete with conventional banks.  
More importantly, these elements would permit their development on the basis of the 
authentic foundations of Islamic financial intermediation and reap the associated benefits.  
This section presents an overview of the risk profile of an operating IFI with references to 
the theoretical model.  
  
In the theoretical version, Islamic banks would at face value be less susceptible to 
instability than their conventional counterparts. This comparative advantage is rooted in 
the risk sharing feature where banks participate in the risks of their counter-parties, and 
investment depositors share the risks of the banking business. Direct market discipline is 
embedded in this risk-sharing principle.
36 In the theoretical model, any negative shock to 
an Islamic bank’s asset returns is absorbed by both shareholders and investment 
depositors.
37 While depositors in the conventional system have a fixed claim on the 
returns to the bank’s assets as they are paid a predetermined interest rate in addition to 
their guaranteed principal irrespective of the bank’s profitability, holders of profit-
sharing investment accounts in the Islamic system share in the bank’s profits and losses 
alongside the shareholders, and hence are exposed to the risk of losing all or part of their 
initial investment.  
 
In prevailing practice, however, the risk-sharing advantage is “neutralized” when 
Islamic banks, operating in mixed systems, pay their investment account holders a 
competitive “market” return regardless of their actual performance and profitability.
38 As 
a result, equity holders’ returns are displaced, creating for them a commercial risk. 
                                                 
36 Market discipline is one of the three main pillars recently emphasized by the Basle Committee in enhancing 
the stability of the international financial market. 
37 See Khan & Ahmed (2001) and  Baldwin  (2002). 
38 Baldwin (2002).   18
Divergence of practice from the theoretical version is also reflected in shifts away from 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) activities, such as mudaraba & musharaka, to other modes 
of financing like ijara &  murabaha.  This shift likely results from risk aversion in 
conducting asset allocation as well as vulnerability due to liquidity on the liabilities side. 
The outcome is dominance in the asset portfolios of short-term, low profit and safe trade 
related transactions limiting the funds that can be invested in longer-term, more profitable 
but riskier assets.  
 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the risk profile of an operating IFI. Risks are 
grouped into five broad categories: transaction, business, treasury, governance and 
systemic risks.  While these categories are also applicable to conventional finance, 
specific risks within them are more relevant to IFI, their balance sheets’ profile and the 
nature of contracts they use (see Annex II for a description of the different risks and their 
impact on different stakeholders ).    19
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It has been argued that the PLS feature of Islamic finance introduces additional 
risks to the industry. Specifically, displaced commercial risk has been identified by 
AAOIFI (1999) as the risk arising when an Islamic bank is under the pressure of paying 
its investment depositors a rate of return higher than what should be payable under the 
“actual” terms of the investment contract. An Islamic bank engages in such self–imposed 
practice to induce its investment account holders not to withdraw their funds in the bank 
to invest them elsewhere. As a result, during bad times the bank may forgo part or all of 
its shareholders’ profits, and this may adversely affect its own capital. An example is the 
International Islamic Bank for Investment & Development in Egypt, which distributed all 
of its profits to investment account holders while the shareholders received nothing from 
the mid to late 1980s.
39  
 
“Withdrawal risk” is at the other end of the spectrum of business risks.  It mainly 
results from the competitive pressures an IFI faces from existing Islamic or conventional 
counterparts. An Islamic bank could be exposed to the risk of withdrawals by its 
depositors as a result of the lower rate of return they would receive compared to what its 
competitors pay.
40 Such withdrawals would erode the franchise value of the bank. 
Another type of business risk is solvency risk, which is the risk that a bank has 
insufficient capital to continue operations.
41 
 
Fiduciary risk has a specific nature in the case of IFI as it directly emanates from 
the PLS feature of Islamic finance. AAOIFI (1999) defines fiduciary risk as that of 
becoming legally liable for a breach of the investment contract either for non-compliance 
with Shariah rules or for mismanagement of investors’ funds. Such legal liability would 
expose the bank to direct losses associated with breach of its fiduciary responsibility 
toward its depositors as well as indirect losses resulting from the decline in the market 
price of its listed shares.
42  
                                                 
39 In 1988, the bank distributed to its depositors an amount exceeding its profits, and the difference appeared in 
the bank’s accounts as “loss carried forward”. It is also reported that this bank was subject to temporary takeover 
by the Central Bank of Egypt; see Warde (2000). 
40 Khan & Ahmed  (2001). 
41 See Greuning & Bratanovic (2003). 
42 The latter effect  should impose indirect market discipline on Islamic banks, as will be discussed in the next 
section.   21
In addition, the reputation of the bank would be adversely affected by negligence 
or misconduct. Even a financially sound Islamic bank could be exposed to the risk of 
failure as a result of losing the confidence of its depositors, who would withdraw their 
funds.
43 Fiduciary risk also exposes both equity holders and investment depositors to risk 




In this context, information disclosure facilitates market discipline and enables 
different stakeholders to protect their own interests by allowing depositors to withdraw 
their funds, shareholders to sell their shares and regulators to take the necessary actions in 
case of any mismanagement or misconduct. However, the current differences in 
accounting treatment between Islamic banks have reduced the comparability, consistency 
and transparency of their financial statements.
45 This creates uncertainty and limits the 
potential role of market discipline. The Basle Committee defines transparency as “the 
public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that information 
to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, 
business activities, risk profile and risk management practices”.
46 Accordingly, lack of 
transparency creates a risk of incurring losses due to bad decisions based on incomplete 
or inaccurate Information. 
 
A related type of governance risk is operational risk defined as the risk of failure 
of internal processes as related to people and systems. Specifically, people risk, arising 
from incompetence or fraud,
47 exposes Islamic banks to potential losses. For instance, an 
internal control problem cost the Dubai Islamic Bank $50 million in 1998 when a bank 
official did not conform to the bank’s credit terms. This also resulted in a run on deposits 
in the magnitude of $138 million, 7% of the bank’s total deposits, in just one day.
48 This 
is in addition to technology risk, another type of operational risk, which is associated with 
                                                 
43 Ali (2002).  
44 For instance, any profits accrued to the bank as a result of investment in non-Shariah acceptable assets would be 
distributed for charity purposes.   
45 Archer & Ahmed (2003). 
46 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (September 1998).  
47Khan & Ahmed (2001). 
48Warde (2000).   22
the use of software and telecommunication systems that are not specifically tailored to 
the needs of Islamic banks.
49  
 
Equally important for the operation of Islamic as well as conventional banks is the 
presence of a conducive institutional environment and an efficient regulatory framework. 
Such poor supporting institutional infrastructure exposes Islamic banks to systemic risks 
related to institutional, legal and regulatory issues. At the forefront of these is 
institutional risk resulting from the lack of consensus among Fiqh scholars on contractual 
rules governing financial transactions. For instance, while some Fiqh scholars consider 
the terms of a murabaha or istisna contract to be binding to the buyer, others argue that 
the buyer has the option to rescind from the contract even after making an order and 
paying the commitment fee.
50 This raises Islamic banks’ exposure to counter-party risks 
arising from the unsettled nature of contracts, and may lead to potential litigation 
problems. A related issue is the general confusion created by the heterogeneous 
interpretations of the fundamental Shariah rules resulting in differences in financial 
reporting, auditing and accounting treatments by Islamic banks.
51 
 
Moreover, the lack of standardized contracts for Islamic financial instruments as 
well as the absence of effective litigation and dispute resolution systems create a business 
environment risk. Poor enforceability of contractual agreements ultimately increases 
Islamic banks’ exposure to counter-party risks of default and delinquency.
52 While the 
imposition of penalty in the case of late payment is not accepted according to Shariah 
law, some banks enforce the penalty as a deterrent mechanism and use the collected sums 
for charitable causes.
53  
                                                 
49 Khan & Ahmed (2001). 
50Khan & Ahmed  (2001). 
51As previously discussed, this results in lack of transparency and comparability in their financial statements; see 
Archer & Ahmed (2003). 
52 Khan & Ahmed (2001). 
53 Archer & Ahmed (2003).   23
Negligence or mistakes in complying with regulations do expose banks to 
regulatory risk and may lead to penalties. Such risk may however result from a high 
degree of discretion on the part of the supervisor or from limited transparency in the 
regulation.
54 Confusion may also result in regulatory risk where Islamic banks are subject 
to dual regulation in countries with mixed systems of Islamic and conventional banking. 
In addition, differences between the supervisory Shariah boards
55 (SSB) of individual IFI 
within each country as well as differences between the regulatory bodies in various 
countries may create general uncertainty as to the rules to be followed.   
 
Treasury management function is a challenging task affecting the performance of 
Islamic banks, which are particularly vulnerable to liquidity risk given their limited 
opportunities to access funds to meet their obligations. Such risk results from the 
mismatch between the maturities of the two sides of the balance sheet, creating either a 
surplus of cash that needs to be invested or a shortage of cash that needs to be funded.
56 
Prohibition by Shariah law from borrowing as well as the absence of an active inter-bank 
money market have restricted Islamic banks’ options to efficiently manage their liquidity 
position.  The current use of secured commodity murabaha and short-term trade 
financing has enabled Islamic banks to invest their short-term surplus cash.
57  However, 




These factors have raised Islamic banks’ exposure to liquidity risk, and adversely 
affected their profitability by limiting their ability to invest their capital in long-term, 
generally less liquid but more profitable assets in order to honor withdrawal requests 
from their depositors. According to Maroun (2002), factors such as lack of Shariah 
                                                 
54 Khan & Ahmed (2001). 
55 SSB is considered to be the governance body within each IFI, and it is responsible for approving the Shariah 
compliance of contracts as well as monitoring their proper implementation; see Archer & Ahmed (2003). 
56 Maroun (2002). 
57 It is estimated that IFIs have $20 to 30 billion available for short-term investment; Ali (2002).   
58Secured commodity murabaha involves the purchase of commodities, traded on the London Metal Exchange, 
with the full payment of the spot price. This is followed by their sale to a third party on the basis of murabaha for 
a deferred payment with a maturity of one week to six months with spot delivery. Repayment of the principal and 
profit is usually guaranteed by an acceptable international bank. Short-term trade financing is similar to secured 
commodity murabaha except for the fact that it is mainly used to finance the importation of basic commodities 
needed locally, such as crude oil. See Maroun (2002).   24
compatible  instruments, the absence of qualified market makers and the limited 
dissemination of information and data hinder the development of well-functioning 
secondary markets where long-term instruments can be traded.  For instance, long-term 
mudaraba investment certificates can provide liquidity for both the bank and the investor 
by enabling the latter to trade the certificates in the secondary market without the need to 
redeem them directly with the issuing bank.
59  In this respect, the establishment of the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center 
(LMC) should permit a more efficient management of IFIs’ liquidity needs.  
 
Islamic banks are also exposed to credit risk.  It is a counter-party risk inherent in 
some modes of Islamic finance.  Exposure to such risk is increased by the absence of well 
developed credit risk assessment systems and associated expertise for Islamic banks.  For 
instance, counter-party risk arises when an Islamic bank makes payment in a bay 
mua’ajal contract, or delivers assets in a murabaha deal before receiving payment, hence 
being exposed to potential loss.  In bay salam or istisna contracts, the bank is exposed to 
the risk of failure to supply on time or at all, or failure to supply the quality of goods as 
contractually specified.  There may also be other related price risks, such as inventory 
storage costs associated with the nature of salam agricultural-based contracts.
60  
 
In PLS activities, use of mudaraba on the assets side of the balance sheet gives 
rise to moral hazard problems.  While rabb-ul-mal (IFI) bears all the losses in case of a 
negative outcome, IFI cannot oblige users of the funds (mudarib) to take the appropriate 
action or exert the required level of effort needed to generate the expected level of 
returns.  Such situations can be exploited by users of IFI’s funds.
61  Also, the bank does 
not have the right to monitor or to participate in management of the project and hence 
may loose its principal investment in addition to its potential profit share if the 
entrepreneur’s books show a loss.
62  
                                                 
59As a result of these constraints, most  transactions take place in the primary market with limited trading in the 
secondary market. Ijara sukuk, issued by the Bahrain Monetary Authority (BMA), present an exception for 
which a secondary market exists. They are traded on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. See Maroun  (2002). 
60 Khan & Ahmed (2001). 
61 Lewis & Algaoud (2002). 
62Errico & Farahbaksh (1998).   25
Mudaraba can also expose an Islamic bank to principal-agent problems where the 
bank enters into the mudaraba contract as rabb-ul-mal or principal, and the mudarib is 
the agent.  The user of the funds (mudarib) may have incentives to expand the 
expenditures on the projects and to increase the consumption of non-pecuniary benefits at 
the expense of pecuniary returns since the increased consumption is partly borne by the 
bank while the benefits are entirely consumed by the entrepreneur.  A similar problem 
arises on the liabilities side, where investment account holders place their money with IFI 
on a mudaraba basis.
63   
 
The moral hazard problem would be reduced in musharaka where the capital of 
the partner (musharik) will also be at stake.  Furthermore, equity partnership would 
minimize the problem of informational asymmetry as the IFI would have the right to 
participate in the management of project in which it is investing.
64  However, the 
musharaka asset class has an associated cost in the form of adverse selection and 
therefore requires extensive screening, information-gathering and monitoring. Each 
musharaka contract would require careful analysis and negotiation of PLS arrangements 
leading to higher cost of intermediation for an IFI.
65  As a result of the problems 
associated with mudaraba and musharaka, IFI would tend to allocate limited funds to 
these asset classes.  This implies an increased reliance on asset-backed securities limiting 
IFI’s choice of investment, and may ultimately hamper their ability to efficiently manage 
risks and diversify their portfolio.  
 
Islamic banks face a market risk regarding notably murabaha contracts. 
Movements in the underlying benchmark interest rate alter the value of the murabaha 
contract held by the bank.
66  Islamic banks are exposed to such risk as their mark-up rate 
                                                 
63 This gives rise to fiduciary risk as previously discussed. 
64 Khan (1994) claims that IFI is able to invest in large enterprises because the users of the funds owning 
large stakes in the business would not put the banks in a disadvantageous position in terms of risk, which 
may reduce overall risk and thus improve the profitability of the bank. 
65 Sadr and Iqbal (2000) provide empirical evidence that increased monitoring resulted in an increase in the 
portfolio size of musharaka contracts on the assets side of the balance sheet of an IFI.  Additional 
monitoring recovered its costs in higher returns. 
66 They often use the underlying market interest rate, usually the LIBOR, as a benchmark to price their 
financing facilities; specifically, murabaha.   26
is held fixed for the duration of the contract while the benchmark rate changes.
67  Foreign 
exchange rate movement is another transaction risk arising from the deferred-trading 
nature of some contracts offered by Islamic banks as the value of the currency in which 




Efficient risk management capacity is necessary to enable Islamic banks to 
strategically position themselves in the global market by reducing their overall risk 
exposure.  The absence of robust risk management systems may deprive Islamic banks 
from the ability to hedge risks, and could undermine their potential contribution.   
Adequate resources need to be devoted to risk identification and measurement as well as 
the development of risk management techniques.  In this respect, there is a pressing need 
to combine solid understanding of Shariah law with strong knowledge of modern risk 
management techniques to be able to develop innovative risk mitigation and hedging 
instruments.   
 
SECTION III:   THE REGULATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
On the basis of the foregoing review of the nature of Islamic financial 
intermediation as well as the risks faced by IFI and the financial system in which they 
operate, the following considers the regulatory framework the industry would need.  This 
is done by considering sequentially the current legal and regulatory framework governing 
IFI, the rationale for regulation, the regulatory options and necessary conditions for 
effective regulation.  
  
A- Current Legal and Regulatory Practice 
The legal and regulatory practice governing Islamic banks varies across 
countries.
69 Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey, U.A.E and Yemen have 
enacted Islamic banking laws.  However, these laws may not always fully take into 
                                                 
67 See Baldwin (2002), Khan & Ahmed (2001) and El Gary (2000). 
68 Khan (2001). 
69See Archer and Ahmed (2003).   27
account unique characteristics of Islamic banking.  For example, the Malaysian Islamic 
Banking Act (1993) refers to banking as a “lending business” and investment accounts 
are considered to be liabilities. In Iran, Islamic banks accept customer investments on the 
basis of the wikala contract, an agency contract, not the mudaraba contract, as is the case 
in other countries.
70  In some of the other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, no laws have been enacted to regulate Islamic banks.  They therefore operate 
under the same laws governing conventional banks. Kuwait’s sole IFI is licensed as a 
finance house, not a bank, and is supervised by the Ministry of Commerce rather than the 
Central Bank. 
 
Greater attention has been paid since the early 1990s to the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks governing IFI.  Differences between balance sheet structures of 
Islamic and conventional banks and the features of Islamic financial contracts have been 
recognized to have important implications for accounting and financial reporting.
71  Early 
studies raising the issues of regulation and supervision of IFI include Archer and Karim 
(1997), Archer, Karim and Al-Deehani (1998), and Errico and Farabakash (1998).
72  
These studies note that an appropriate regulatory framework needs to place greater 
emphasis on accounting standards and information disclosure. Errico and Farabakash 
(1998) suggest a supervisory framework based on the standards and best practices 
established by the Basle Committee, and an Islamic finance-tailored prudential 
framework based on the CAMEL system. Errico and Sundarajan (2002) reinforce this 
view by recommending a regulatory framework created along the same lines as a 
CAMEL framework and the adoption of an SEC-type disclosure system.  AAOIFI has 
promulgated a Statement on the Purpose and Calculations of Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) for Islamic Banks, which takes into account differences between deposit accounts 
in conventional banking and investment accounts in Islamic banking.
73  This statement 
                                                 
70 The wikala contract operates on the basis of the agent receiving a fixed fee, not a share of profits like in 
the mudaraba.  
71 See AAOIFI (1999) and Archer & Ahmed (2003). 
72 A number of other studies have been prepared since then, many quoted in this paper. 
73 See also Mulajawan, Dar & Hall (2002) for a discussion of the issue and a suggestion for a modified 
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builds on the capital adequacy principles laid down by the Basel Committee.
74  Archer 
and Ahmeds (2003) point out features of Islamic finance that require specific accounting, 
corporate governance and prudential regulations.  They note issues regarding the 
applicability of the IAS to IFI and further describe efforts undertaken notably by AAOIFI 
in creating accounting and auditing regulations, standardizing Shariah interpretations and 
establishing capital adequacy ratios for IFI.   
 
In November 2002, a group of central banks from Islamic countries established in 
Kuala Lumpur the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB).  The purpose of the IFSB is 
to develop international standards relevant to the IFI including corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure.  With the IFSB, AAOIFI and the Islamic rating agency as 
well as the various national efforts at providing a framework governing Islamic financial 
intermediation, the essential building blocks for the formulation and implementation of 
public policy are coming into place.  Exploiting the synergies between these initiatives 
will be essential for a growing industry consolidating its credentials. 
 
B - Why Financial Regulation 
 
Considering the theoretical models of either the “two-tier mudaraba” or “two-
windows”, and conventional rationales for regulation, this paper argues in the following 
that it is reasonable to propose minimal regulation of IFI operating according to the core 
risk sharing principles.  However, prevailing practice of Islamic finance appears to 
present risks akin to those in conventional banking and would require a similar regulatory 
framework.  In reaching these views, the paper proceeds by first outlining rationales for 
regulation.  It is believed that clarity on the rationale for regulation is an important 
prerequisite to avoid either over-regulating and stifling business activity, or under-
regulating and leaving too much room for risk-taking in the pursuit of profitability.  
 
                                                 
74 See also Chapra & Khan (2000) and Mulajawan, Dar, and Hall (2002).     29
There are diverse views on the need for regulation in conventional finance.  They 
range from positions of almost total opposition to any regulation,
75 to the justification of 
broad, intrusive regulation.  These positions reflect varying views on different rationales 
for regulation, in particular: i) the supply of a public good; ii) the protection of public 
resources, or iii) the enhancement of the integrity of fiduciary contracts.  Islamic finance 
has been subject to a similar diversity of views. For example El Sheikkh (2000) mentions, 
among others, “the widely held view by Islamic jurists … that Islamic banks should not 
be regulated or supervised by any authority”.
76   
 
While acknowledging the latter view, Chapra and Khan (2000) argue the need for 
regulation.  In the following, the paper contrasts prevailing rationales for regulation with 
various arguments made notably by Chapra and Khan (2000) for the regulation of IFI. 
The paper considers sequentially the public good, protection of depositors and integrity 
of fiduciary contracts views of regulation, and then assesses their relevance to IFI.  
 
(1) Public Good View.  In conventional finance, one view is that regulation 
provides a public good that the market cannot supply on its own.  This perspective would 
proceed from two premises. A first one is that the objective of prudential regulation is the 
mitigation of risks taken by stakeholders (e.g., depositors) unable to undertake on their 
own the necessary due diligence to assess these risks.  In practice, it is the inability of a 
majority of depositors to assess the quality of the contract they enter into when they 
decide to place their resources with a financial institution. Some stakeholders have 
sufficient investment savvy to develop these assessments on their own and would not in 
principle need, in the same degree, the support of public regulation, except for 
transparency and disclosure requirements necessary to conduct their due diligence. 
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A second premise of the public good approach is that the objective of prudential 
regulation is the mitigation of risks of disruption of the normal business performed by the 
financial system in terms of payments or the provision of liquidity.  Such systemic risks 
could be the outcome of a spillover from distress in one institution unable to honor its 
commitments, undermining the confidence in the system.  It could also be the result of a 
failure in the payments system itself, whether its material infrastructure or the 
mechanisms and instruments to exchange liquidity.   
 
From the foregoing, public prudential regulation supplies two types of public 
services: a) the mitigation of the risks faced by the stakeholders needing protection, in 
various degrees, and b) the mitigation of the risks that could lead to dangerous systemic 
disruptions and contagion.  Consequently, from the public good perspective, prudential 
regulation would call for a clear sense of the type, quality and quantity of the public good 
to be delivered, as well as the nature of the risks and risk exposure or values at risk 
involved.   
 
(2) Protection of Public Resources View.  Another conventional finance view of 
financial regulation is that the existence of an explicit or implicit safety net, notably in the 
form of deposit insurance, creates a government contingent liability.  The existence of 
such a commitment of public resources would entail not only the right, but also the duty 
of the public authority to regulate activities whose performance may endanger these 
resources.  This view is not unrelated to the public good perspective as the existence of 
deposit insurance is itself a public service.  
 
(3) Integrity of Fiduciary Contracts.  Another perspective on regulation is 
provided by a focus on the fiduciary nature of the business of finance.  The role of 
regulation is seen here as the provision of sufficient checks and bounds to mitigate the 
risks of the intermediary failing the trust of its stakeholders.  These are generally seen as 
the depositors, but also include small shareholders, raising the importance of corporate 
governance.   
   31
Four reasons presented by Chapra and Khan (2000) for the regulation of IFI are 
discussed in light of the foregoing three views on the rationale for regulation.  
 
a)  Systemic considerations, particularly the need to maintain an orderly payments 
system and ensure the development of the economy.  
•  The promotion of orderly payments is clearly in the nature of a public 
good and consistent with this rationale for financial regulation.  Whether 
in the theoretical model of an IFI or in current practice, regulation is 
likely to be required to mitigate the risks of disruption in payments. 
•   The promotion of economic development may be beyond the role that 
should be assigned to financial regulation.  The latter can promote trust in 
the financial system, encourage more intermediation and diminish the risk 
of failure, all elements that would encourage activity expansion.   
However the design of financial regulation to directly promote 
development may distort its objectives of ensuring soundness and stability 
and pose difficult challenges for regulators having to choose between 
promoting economic development and ensuring the stability of the 
financial system.  
 
b)  Protecting the interest of demand depositors. In terms of a theoretical IFI model, 
the case for introducing regulation to protect depositors is less compelling than in 
conventional finance.  This view seems to underlie the “two-tier mudaraba” 
model that does not envisage any reserve requirement.  The essence of Islamic 
financial intermediation being symmetrical risk as well as profit and loss sharing, 
introducing a guarantee on the downside would run counter to the core objective.  
Investment depositors should however expect to be informed on the features of 
the contract they enter into and have a recourse if it is breached.  Hence regulation 
promoting the integrity of fiduciary contracts would be consistent with the   32
theoretical IFI model.
77  With existing IFI, depositors may not always be fully 
apprised on the risks they face in principle with their deposits while at the same 
time IFI try to protect their deposit base by providing sufficient security assurance 
and returns.  In this case, there is a case for regulation that seeks to protect 
depositors, public resources and fiduciary contract integrity. The protection of 
demand depositors is envisaged in the “two-windows” model and can be justified 
through either of the three perspectives considered in this paper. 
 
c)  Ensuring compliance with Shariah.  The relationship between civil and religious 
law varies across national jurisdictions.  In the case where there is an orientation 
toward a strong separation, it would be difficult to justify assigning to public 
authorities the role of ensuring that banking activities comply with Shariah.  This 
would be considered a private religious matter that does not call for public 
intervention.  The issue of truth in disclosure and in advertisement would however 
remain and would allow stakeholders to have a recourse.  This would not however 
be a matter of financial regulation, but one of broad institutional infrastructure for 
business.  In jurisdictions where the distinction between civil and religious law is 
less pronounced, one can well see a public policy choice for assigning to a public 
regulator the role of ensuring that banking activity complies with Shariah.  
   
d)  Supporting the integration of IFI in the international financial system.  Integration 
would develop from the participation of IFI in the financing of international trade 
and international payments.  Counterparts of IFI would want to be satisfied of the 
ability and commitment of IFI to fulfill the contracts they enter into.  In this 
respect national and international regulation can be founded on the public good 
need to ensure orderly participation in international payments and the integrity of 
fiduciary contracts.   
 
                                                 
77 The protection of demand depositors, e.g., amana deposits, and their role in payments could call for some 
regulation, however.  At the same time, it raises the issue of the nature of the business in which the 
institution is engaged.   33
C - Regulatory Options 
Regulators have traditionally governed their jurisdictions through direct rules 
mostly on capital, assets and income allocations.
78  At the same time, regulatory changes 
often lag financial developments and may consequently either constrain the ability of 
financial institutions to flexibly manage their portfolios, or provide them with 
opportunities to take unchecked risks implicitly comforted by the existing safety net.
79  In 
adapting to these developments, the profession is now moving toward letting regulated 
institutions assess and manage their risks within a framework agreed on with the 
regulator.
80  In this context, numerous voices call for the introduction of mechanisms to 
let the market impose the needed discipline on financial intermediaries,
81 while others 
have questioned the applicability and effectiveness of such market reliant approaches.
82 
 
In light of the foregoing, two sets of issues face regulators of IFI, once they have 
clarified the rationale for the introduction of regulation.  These issues relate first to the 
type of regulation needed and second to the method of regulation.  In terms of type of 
regulation, one can consider issues such as capital, transparency or licensing 
requirements.  The method of regulation can rely in various degrees on direct “command 
and control” rules, on market discipline (direct and/or indirect) or institution home 
developed risk assessments.  The type and method of regulation chosen will depend on 
the rationale for regulation adopted and on the type of IFI considered, be it a model 
Islamic financial intermediary or in line with prevailing practice.  
                                                 
78 This is described as “the increasingly ineffective command-and-control regulations” in Chami, Khan,  
and Sharma (2003). 
79 MacLachlan (2001). 
80 See notably Basel Committee On Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2003).  
81 See Calomiris (1999) and Evanoff & Wall (2000).  The essence of market discipline is to induce market 
investors to penalize excessive risk-taking by raising funding cost and limiting its availability.  This can 
happen directly with depositors demanding higher returns or withdrawing their deposits.  It can happen 
indirectly if there is an asset traded in the market whose price promptly reflects investors’ assessments of 
the risks that the institution that has issued them is taking.   
82 Basel Committee On Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2003), Bliss (2001) and Karacadag & Shrivastava 
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(1) In a theoretical IFI model, minimal regulation is expected with less emphasis 
on capital requirements, more on transparency and disclosure, probably more on 
screening management profile and business line in licensing, and equivalent in 
supervision as compared to conventional banking.  There would be also an expectation of 
larger reliance on direct market discipline and less on “command and control regulation”.   
 
Theoretical IFI models developed to date could be either the “two-tier mudaraba” 
or “two-window” type, in essence using mostly PLS accounts on both sides of the balance 
sheets. They would provide trade finance or facilitation as well as payments services. 
They would take amana deposits as part of these services.  The PLS intermediation has 
direct market discipline embedded in it and hence should not lead to a capital 
requirement.  Some minimal capital may be needed for protecting the reputation of the 
institution, that is its legitimacy as a partner for all its stakeholders.
83  But one could 
argue that sufficient transparency and disclosure should allow markets to judge this 
legitimacy and induce the institution on its own volition to maintain the needed level of 
capital.  The case for a capital requirement to protect orderly payments and amana 
deposits would be stronger.  It is not likely to lead to the same capital requirement and 
would suggest the need to consider the appropriateness of bundling the intermediation 
and payments services in the same balance sheet.  Consequently, the regulation of a 
theoretical IFI would need to put a heavy emphasis on transparency and disclosure as 
well as licensing requirements, but de-emphasize a capital requirement. 
 
(2)  In an existing IFI, prevailing intermediation practices would seem to point to 
the need for equivalent emphasis on a capital requirement, supervision and licensing, and 
a larger one on transparency and disclosure, compared to conventional banks.
84 
Competitive pressure is inducing IFI in the market to provide sufficient safety and return 
to depositors in unrestricted investment accounts. They consequently face the risk of 
“displacing” shareholders in their returns and capital to accommodate these depositors. 
                                                 
83 This would deal with Chapra’s and Khan’s point on the acceptance of IFI as members of the international 
financial system, sometimes also referred to as international integration. 
84 In conventional banks that offer a window for Islamic services, there may be opportunities for regulatory 
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As a result they are practically facing a similar intermediation risk to conventional banks 
and should therefore be subject to similar capital and supervision requirements. The 
pooling of amana, unrestricted investment deposits and capital in funding their assets 
raises transparency issues for the distribution of returns or losses. It consequently calls for 
rigorous transparency and disclosure requirements.  It would also call for significant 
scrutiny in licensing, notably with respect to managers’ profiles.   
 
D - Requisites for Effective Regulation 
Effective regulation requires readable, reliable signals of the risks that a financial 
institution faces resulting from its own behavior or from events external to it, as well as 
risks that may affect the financial system through contagion, or infrastructure failure. It 
also requires an ability to process these readable signals and to introduce the appropriate 
corrective actions as needed. As such it may be more akin to sophisticated art that uses 
advanced techniques.
85 But even if art presumes independence and creativity, beyond the 
availability of a good technique, it still requires the necessary tools. 
 
In this respect the role of the broader institutional infrastructure is core.  Of 
particular importance would be the clarity and enforceability of property rights, the 
quality of contract law and opportunity to bring prompt remedies to breaches, the 
efficiency of judicial recourse and other dispute resolution mechanisms.  The majority of 
existing IFI operate however in jurisdictions where there is much left to be desired in 
these matters, which adversely affects their development. 
 
More closely related to finance, the quality and transparency of accounting and 
auditing play a crucial role. Measurement and comparison of risk exposure should 
underlie regulation.  The efforts at establishing accounting and auditing standards for IFI 
have made a significant contribution in this respect. However, disclosure of accounting 
results may not be an adequate instrument for risk assessment because, as a structure, 
                                                 
85 Although dealing with the Federal Reserve policies and not regulation per se, Woodward’s title of his 
book on A. Greenspan, “The Maestro,” is indicative of this aspect.    36
accounting is directed toward value, not risk allocation.
86  This situation gives additional 
importance to other services, such as the collection and dissemination of financially 
relevant information and credit rating. In addition it would call for renewed efforts at 
enhancing the relevance of accounting and auditing for risk assessment.   
 
With financial innovation, including through IFI, various instruments and 
structures are emerging to meet the demand for specific services.  As a result, the 
functions of financial institutions are evolving continuously.  Such increased fluidity of 
the objects of regulation calls for nimbleness and skills on the part of the regulator with a 
frequent assessment of the adequacy of their perspective.
87   
 
SECTION IV: A VISION FOR THE ISLAMIC FINANCE INDUSTRY 
The combination of services offered by operating IFI and the prevailing practices 
they follow compound the difficulties of designing a regulatory framework to govern 
them.  First, the problem of co-mingled funds from different classes of deposit holders 
needs to be addressed. One approach could be to encourage IFI to structure their 
operations in clearly defined and separated segments catering to different classes of 
depositors depending on their respective investment objectives.  For example, one class 
of depositors may be looking for custodial services only, while the others may need to 
place funds for performing day to day transactions and therefore would not exhibit any 
risk appetite. Similarly, there may be a class of depositors that is less risk averse and 
therefore would like IFI to deploy its savings for longer term. 
 
Therefore, a vision consistent with principles could see an IFI structured as a 
group of fairly independent entities, each designed to optimize the functional demands of 




                                                 
86 Merton (1995). 
87 For example, Merton (1995) suggests considering a functional rather than an institutional perspective  for 
regulation to enhance the ability of regulators to follow market developments.     37















Segment A is designed to handle funds for depositors who are highly risk averse 
and require a high level of liquidity and would use the funds for daily transactions or 
would prefer to keep savings in safe assets where their capital (principal) is preserved.  
This segment will invest funds in asset-backed securities with fixed-income 
characteristics and IFI will intermediate by screening and monitoring such opportunities 
and making sure that credit and operational risk are contained.  The concept is similar to 
narrow banking and would require a similar approach to its regulation. 
 
Segment B is designed to cater to depositors with the next level of risk appetite 
who are willing to take some risk in expectation for a higher return, with capital 
preservation and liquidity less high on their agenda.  IFI would deploy these funds in 
medium- to long-term instruments, such as ijara or istisna, or may prefer to invest on 
mudaraba basis directly with the entrepreneur or through mudaraba certificates.  If there 
is a well developed secondary market for mudaraba based funding, then the form of 
intermediation taken by IFI will be very similar to mutual funds where IFI will manage 
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agreement with the depositors would be similar to the fiduciary responsibility of a mutual 
fund in a conventional system, the same regulatory principles would apply. 
 
Segment C is designed for investors who would be willing to take additional risk 
and would like to participate in riskier investments, like private equity or venture capital.  
IFI could deploy these funds on the basis of musharaka or mudaraba instruments.  When 
funds are invested on musharaka basis, the IFI also gains rights to participate in the 
governance of the enterprise, which raises another issue for regulators.  The IFI as equity 
participant becomes an institutional investor that has a vested interest in the governance 
of the institutions, the recipients of funds. This implies that the financial institution itself 
becomes a stakeholder in the enterprises that depend on funds it provides. Since Islamic 
financial principles advocate a stakeholder approach to corporate governance, the IFI 
would be expected to conduct active monitoring of enterprises it invests in. In these 
circumstances, the IFI would behave in a similar way to financial institutions in a bank-
based or insider system practiced in Germany or Japan.  It would be expected that a 
representative of IFI participate in supervisory boards of enterprises in which they have 
considerable investment and a long-term relationship. The IFI’s relationship with 
musharaka  enterprises would be of long-term nature with active involvement in 
governance in contrast to a short-term, transactional relationship.  
 
To summarize, an IFI structured to provide financial intermediation through 
clearly segmented windows or even separate institutions would make the task of 
regulators easier.  Each entity could then be subject to a regulating principle most suited 
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SECTION V: CONCLUSION: THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
Regulators cannot avoid acknowledging the presence of an industry handling in 
excess of $200 billion, growing fast at more than 10% annually, and with a market 
potential possibly close to 10% of global GDP.  These same facts point, however, to the 
need for flexibility and alertness on the part of regulators, given the emerging nature of 
the industry, its need to adapt to the needs of the markets it serves, the competitive 
pressure from conventional finance, the variations of views on the role it should play and 
the divergence between its practice and the theoretical model on which it is based.  
 
Under the circumstances, regulators would want to consider a two-pronged 
strategy: managing the transition, and shaping the vision.  In managing the transition, 
regulators need to promote the stability of existing IFI whose financial intermediation 
practices reflect the conditions of their environment and their stakeholders’ demands. 
These practices and the risks associated with them, outlined in this paper, include: a) the 
presence of balance sheets with limited weight of profit and loss sharing accounts, b) an 
emphasis on trade and short-term financing, c) risks akin to ones faced by conventional 
banks, like “displacement risks”, and d) market risks based on interest rates benchmarks 
used by conventional banks.  Given the close affinity of prevailing practice of established 
Islamic finance and conventional banking, the regulatory framework in the transition 
should be mostly similar to the one applying to the regulatory framework of conventional 
banks.  One overarching issue that needs to be addressed is the standardization of 
contracts and major financial instruments across the industry to facilitate growth, ease 
access to liquidity and enhance risk assessment capabilities.  Transparency enhancements 
are also essential for the development of the industry. 
 
Beyond the transition, a consensus on a vision of the nature of the industry, the 
role it would play in the development of the communities it serves, and how it would play 
it will be essential for its sustainable development. A significant intellectual effort geared 
at providing practical ways of achieving consistency between the demands of the market 
place and underlying principles will need to be ongoing. This effort will need to include   40
debates that remain substantive, consultative, and evidence-based.  In particular it is 
important to be clear on the type of Islamic financial intermediation being considered 
with a special attention given to the different nature of the theoretical model and current 
practices.  
 
This paper outlines elements of a possible vision that would be compatible with 
the fundamental principles of Islamic finance.  In particular it sees merit in considering 
separating the functions of Islamic intermediation in various windows or institutions. 
Such a separation could permit the development of financial intermediation more 
consistent with the fundamental principles of risk-sharing, materiality and no 
exploitation. At the same time it could help enhance the transparency of the industry.  It 
would also bring to bear the market discipline features embedded in the nature of Islamic 
financial intermediation, and contribute to its stability.  An Islamic financial industry 
incorporating such a segmentation would likely require lighter and more focused 
regulation, enhancing its competitiveness. 
 
The paper contributes also conceptual benchmarks that could help shape an 
appropriate regulatory framework for the transition, as well as for an industry evolved 
toward practices more consistent with its premises. In particular the paper discusses 
various rationales for the introduction of regulation and the implications for their 
configuration. Considering the regulation of existing IFI, prevailing intermediation 
practices would seem to point to the need for equivalent emphasis on capital requirement, 
supervision and licensing, and a larger one on transparency and disclosure, compared to 
conventional banks.  Considering the theoretical IFI model, one can expect minimal 
regulation with less emphasis on capital requirements, more on transparency and 
disclosure, probably more on screening management profile and business line in 
licensing, and an equivalent in supervision as compared to what applies to conventional 
banking.  There would be also an expectation of larger reliance on direct market 
discipline and less on “command and control regulation”.     41
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Annex I 
Glossary of some Arabic terms 
Amana 
(Demand deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping 
purpose. They are guaranteed in capital 
value, and earn no return.  
Bay mu’ajal 
(Pre-delivery, deferred payment) 
The seller can sell a product on the basis of 
a deferred payment, in installments or in a 
lump sum. The price of the product is 
agreed upon between the buyer and the 
seller at the time of the sale, and cannot 
include any charges for deferring payment. 
Bay salam 
(Pre-payment, deferred delivery) 
The buyer pays the seller the full 
negotiated price of a product that the seller 
promises to deliver at a future date.  
Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
It refers to Islamic jurisprudence that 
covers all aspects of life: religious, 
political, social and economic. Fiqh is 
mainly based on interpretations of the 
Qur’an and Sunna  (sayings and deeds of 
the prophet).  
Ijara 
(Lease, lease purchase) 
A party leases a particular product for a 
specific sum and a specific time period. In 
the case of a lease purchase, each payment 
includes a portion that goes toward the 
final purchase and transfer of ownership of 
the product.  
Istisna 
(Deferred payment, deferred delivery) 
A manufacturer (contractor) agrees to 
produce (build) and to deliver a certain 
good (or premise) at a given price on a 
given date in the future.  The price does not 
have to be paid in advance (in contrast to 
bay salam). It may be paid in installments 
or part may be paid in advance while the 
balance to be paid later on, based on the 
preferences of the parties.   
Ju’ala 
(Service charge) 
A party pays another a specified amount of 
money as a fee for rendering a specific 
service in accordance to the terms of the 
contract stipulated between the two parties. 
This mode usually applies to transactions 
such as consultations & professional 
services, fund placements and trust 
services. 
Kifala  It is a pledge given to a creditor that the 
debtor will pay the debt, fine or liability. A 
third party becomes surety for the payment   46
of the debt if unpaid by the person 
originally liable. 
Mudaraba 
(Trustee finance contract) 
Rabb -ul- mal (capital’ s owner) provides 
the entire capital needed to finance a 
project while the entrepreneur offers his 
labor and expertise. Profits are shared 
between them at a certain fixed ratio, 
whereas financial losses are exclusively 
borne by rabb -ul- mal. The liability of the 




The seller informs the buyer of his cost of 
acquiring or producing a specified product. 
The profit margin is then negotiated 
between them. The total cost is usually 




The bank enters into an equity partnership 
agreement with one or more partners to 
jointly finance an investment project. 
Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in 




These are zero – return loans that the 
Qur’an encourages Muslims to make to the 
needy. Banks are allowed to charge 
borrowers a service fee to cover the 
administrative expenses of handling the 
loan. The fee should not be related to the 
loan amount or maturity. 
Shariah 
(Islamic Law) 
The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur’an 
and  Sunna  (sayings & deeds of the 
Prophet) 
Takaful  Arabic name for insurance based on 
Shariah rules. An Islamic Insurance is a 
collective protection scheme. It literally 
means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity 
and is akin to mutual insurance. 
Wikala  An Agency contract which may include in 
its terms a fee for the agent.  Same contract 
can also be used to give a power of 
attorney to someone to represent another’s 
interests. 
Zakat  Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to 
be paid to the needy.  
Sources: Archer & Ahmed (2003), Chapra & Ahmed (2002) and Errico & Farrahbaksh 
(1998)   47
Annex II 
Types of risks facing operating Islamic Banks 
 
Institution Depositors    
Type of risk  Definition  Bank Shareholders  Demand  Investment 
Credit risk 
Credit risk is failure of counter-
party to meet his or her 
obligations timely and on the 
agreed terms of the contract 
The bank faces counter-party risks 
in the various forms of contracts: 
such as, bay mua’jal, mudaraba, 
musharaka, murabaha, 
  They face the risk that the bank does not 
honor requests for withdrawals at face 
value 
They face the risk that the bank does 
not honor requests for withdrawals at  
market value 
Market risk is the risk 
associated with change in the 
market value of held assets 
        
Mark–up risk is risk of 
divergence between the 
murabaha  contract  mark–up 
and the market benchmark rate 
The bank may incur losses if the 
benchmark rate changes adversely 



















Foreign Exchange risk is the 
risk of the impact of exchange 
rate movements on assets 
denominated in foreign 
currency  
This exposes the bank to risks 
associated with their deferred–
trading transactions  
    
Business risk results from 
competitive pressures from 
existing counterparts  
      
Displaced Commercial risk is 
the risk of divergence between 
assets’ performance and 
expectations for returns on 
liabilities 
Displaced commercial risk may 
adversely affect the value of the 
bank’s capital. Return on equity 
goes down 
Shareholders are exposed 
to the risk of not 
receiving their share of 
the bank’s profit 
  Investment depositors may have to 
forgo receiving their mudarib share 
Withdrawal risk  where the 
bank is exposed to the risk of 
withdrawal of deposits  
Withdrawal risk exposes the bank 
to liquidity problems and erosion of 
its franchise value 



















Solvency risk is the risk of a 
bank having insufficient capital 
to continue operations 
Solvency risk may expose the bank 
to loss of its reputation 




(ALM) risk  
Asset & Liability Management 
(ALM) risk is a balance sheet 
mismatch risk resulting from 
the difference in terms and 
conditions of a bank’s portfolio 
on its asset & liability sides  






Liquidity risk  Liquidity risk is the risk of 
bank’s inability to access liquid 
funds to meet its obligations 
The bank is exposed to risk of 
failure to honor requests for 
withdrawals from its depositors 
  They face the risk of not being able to 
















Hedging risk  
 
Hedging risk is the risk of 
failure to mitigate & manage 
the different types of risks 
This increases the bank’ s overall 
risk exposure  
    
Operational risk  Operational risk is the risk of 
failure of internal processes as 
related to people or systems  
The bank incurs losses due to 
occurrence of that risk hence may 
fail to meet its obligations towards 
the different stakeholders 
This risk adversely affects 
return on equity 
  This risk adversely affects return on 
assets 
Fiduciary risk  - Fiduciary risk is the risk of 
facing legal recourse action in 
case the bank breaches its 
fiduciary responsibility towards 
depositors and shareholders.  
- Risk of loss of reputation 
 
Legal recourse may lead to 
charging the bank a penalty or a 
compensation. This may lead to 
withdrawal of deposits, sale of 
shares, bad access to liquidity or 
decline in the market price of 
shares if listed on the stock 
exchange 
This risk adversely affects 
return on equity 
  This risk exposes investment 



















Transparency risk is the risk of 
consequences of decisions 
based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information which 
is the outcome of poor 
disclosure  




Business environment risk is 
the risk of poor broad 
institutional environment 
including legal risk whereby 
banks are unable to enforce 
their contracts.  
Business environment risk 
increases banks’ exposure to 
counter-party risk as weak 
contracts are not easily enforceable 
    
Institutional 
risk 
Institutional risk is the risk of 
divergence between product 
definition and practices 
Institutional risk exposes the bank 
to counter-party risks due to the 
unsettled nature of the contract  













Regulatory risk  Regulatory risk is the risk of 
non-compliance with 
regulations due to confusion, 
bad management or mistakes 
Banks may be penalized for non 
complying with the rules or 
regulations. It could be an issue 
with the regulator or supervisor 
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